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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, virtual contacts can establish specific
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
under the effects-based test of Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984), where the relevant online
activity is equally accessible nationwide but its
content focuses on the forum state and the tortfeasor
has knowingly caused the plaintiff to suffer
reputational and emotional harm in the forum state, a
question left open by this Court’s decision in Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014).

(i)
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner was plaintiff in the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County and appellee in the Supreme Court
of Alabama.
Respondent Facebook, Inc., was a defendant in
the Jefferson County Circuit Court and appellant in
the Supreme Court of Alabama.
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
The status of the other defendants in the same
originating case (Jefferson County Circuit Court, No.
C.V.17-255) is as follows:
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child. v. Claudia
D’Arcy, (default judgment entered December
18, 2017).
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Renee L.
Gelin, (order denying motion to dismiss and
granting
preliminary
injunction
issued
December 18, 2017; reversed and remanded
with instructions by the Supreme Court of
Alabama on June 28, 2019 (No. 1170294);
pending settlement).
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Kim
McLeod, (order denying motion to dismiss and
granting
preliminary
injunction
issued
December 18, 2017; reversed and remanded
with instructions by the Supreme Court of
Alabama on June 28, 2019 (No. 1170336);
pending settlement).

iii
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Jennifer L.
Wachowski, (default judgment entered on
March 26, 2019).
There are no additional proceedings in any court that
are directly related to this case.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner K.G.S. respectfully petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of Alabama in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama
(Pet. App. 1a–52a) is slated to be published, __ So. 2d.
__, and is currently available at 2019 Ala. LEXIS 63.
That court’s order denying rehearing is unpublished.
(Pet. App. 60a–61a). The orders of the Circuit Court
of Jefferson County granting a preliminary injunction
(Pet. App. 55a–57a), denying Facebook’s motion to
dismiss (Pet. App. 58a–59a), and dismissing K.G.S.’s
claims against Facebook with prejudice after remand
(Pet. App. 53a–54a) were issued without opinion and
are unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Alabama issued its opinion
on June 28, 2019. Rehearing was denied on August 23,
2019. Justice Thomas, Circuit Justice for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, extended
the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari to and
including January 17, 2020. This Court’s jurisdiction
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
(1)

2
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Alabama’s long-arm rule, found in Alabama Rule
of Civil Procedure 4.2, is reproduced at Pet. App. 62a–
65a.
INTRODUCTION
This case raises an important and recurring
question expressly left open by this Court—under
what circumstances can virtual conduct provide the
requisite minimum contacts to allow a forum state to
exercise specific jurisdiction, when the intentional
torts providing the basis of the claim are “committed
via the Internet or other electronic means.” Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014).
This question is increasingly urgent. Today “the
most important place[] (in a spatial sense) for the
exchange of views … is clear. It is cyberspace — the
vast democratic forums of the Internet in general, and
social media in particular.” Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). And in
commerce, “[b]etween targeted advertising and
instant access to most consumers via any internetenabled device, a business may be present in a State
in a meaningful way without that presence being
physical in the traditional sense of the term.” South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
For good or for ill, many personal and business
relationships now take place entirely online (servers
aside). In doctrine after doctrine, this Court has
grappled with the changes wrought by this digital
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revolution, and the receding importance of physical
presence or contacts—but not yet for personal
jurisdiction.
The time to answer the question left open in
Walden is now. In the absence of clear guidance from
this Court, some courts of appeals and state courts of
last resort—like the Alabama Supreme Court here—
have unduly cabined the possibility of specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that
operates predominantly online, and therefore
everywhere. As alleged below, Facebook reviewed but
refused to remove, and continued to disseminate, an
Alabama-focused Facebook page—about Alabama
residents, 1 drawn from Alabama sources, containing
articles that criticized Alabama law and videos filmed
in Alabama—even after being put on notice that the
content violated Alabama law (because it disclosed
information specially shielded from disclosure by
Alabama statute) and that it was being disseminated
to Alabama users, and therefore causing harm to an
Alabama resident within the state.
Other than updating the medium from a
nationwide print magazine mailed throughout the
country (including a large number of subscribers in
the forum state) to a page disseminated nationwide
online (including a large number of users in the forum
state), this case is no different than Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783 (1984). This Court’s pre-internet
precedents involving specific jurisdiction over the
intentional dissemination of harmful material should
1

The parties in the contested adoption that gave rise to this
case—the birth mother, K.G.S., and Baby Doe—are all Alabama
residents.
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thus have controlled, such that the purposeful
exploitation of a local market (through targeted
content) with knowledge that the brunt of the harm
will be suffered in the forum (given extensive
readership there) should have sufficed to establish
specific jurisdiction.
By holding that due process precluded
jurisdiction here, the Alabama Supreme Court paid lip
service to Calder, but effectively eviscerated it.
Following other courts that have done the same, the
Alabama Supreme Court misread Walden to
effectively confine Calder and similar cases to their
facts. Yet nothing in Walden purports to overrule
those precedents. On the contrary, Walden expressly
left open the question of whether and how those
precedents apply in the modern world—specifically
how a defendant’s virtual contacts with the forum
state can establish minimum contacts consistent with
the Due Process Clause. This case provides an
opportunity for the Court to answer the question left
open in Walden, and to provide much needed clarity to
the lower courts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. In the summer of 2015, K.G.S. filed a petition
in Alabama to adopt Baby Doe, which was contested
by the birth mother. Pet. App. 5a. The Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals affirmed the adoption. See K.L.R. v.
K.G.S., 264 So. 3d 65 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018); Pet. App.
5a n.4.
The birth mother then shared her version of
events with Mirah Riben, “a well-known critic of the
United States’ adoption system.” Pet. App. 5a. In July

5
2015, the Huffington Post published two online
articles about the Alabama adoption authored by
Riben which revealed confidential information,
including the identities of the birth mother and
K.G.S.—kept confidential in the adoption proceedings
under Alabama law—and published photographs of
Baby Doe. Pet. App. 5a. The articles described the
birth mother’s signing of a pre-birth consent to the
adoption, her change of heart after giving birth, and
how her failure to legally withdraw the pre-birth
consent allowed K.G.S. to adopt Baby Doe. Pet. App.
5a–6a. The article also stated that pre-birth contracts
such as the one signed by Baby Doe’s birth mother
were legal in Alabama, but illegal in 48 other states.
First Amended Complaint (FAC), Exhibit A, at 5,
Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, at 336. 2
Working with the birth mother in an attempt to
pressure K.G.S. to give up the legal adoption, Claudia
D’Arcy (a New York resident) created a Facebook page
to disseminate the articles and to establish a
discussion forum for the issues they raised regarding
the Alabama adoption and Alabama’s pre-birth
consent rule. Pet. App. 67a, 70a–71a (FAC ¶¶ 6, 14,
19). The page’s content was focused on the Baby Doe
adoption. The page included photos of K.G.S., Baby
Doe, and the adoption attorney, attached the articles,
included K.G.S.’s full name, and revealed new details
about the contested Alabama adoption, in violation of
2

This case was originally filed under seal, but as the Alabama
Supreme Court noted, Pet. App. 7a n.5, the case was later
unsealed and marked “confidential.” No confidential material is
revealed in this petition or its appendix. The Petition Appendix
contains the operative complaint, but not its exhibits, which
contain confidential material.
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the Alabama adoption code. Pet. App. 50a n.18; Pet.
App. 71a (FAC ¶¶ 20–21).
The Facebook page was “persistently updated”
with posts, news articles, and videos filmed in
Jefferson County, Alabama. Pet. App. 72a (FAC ¶ 25).
It was freely available to Alabama residents to access,
Pet. App. 27a n.11, and was read by K.G.S.’s “business
associates, friends, and certain family members.” Pet.
App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32). Following the launch of the
Facebook page, K.G.S. was “inundated with
appallingly malicious and persistent cyber-bullying,”
Pet. App. 6a, including “hateful messages from
random individuals and organizations inside ... the
State of Alabama via telephone, email, or regular
mail.” Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 30).
K.G.S.’s attorney notified Facebook in a July
2015 letter that the Facebook page violated the
confidentiality provisions of the Alabama Adoption
Code, § 26-10A-1 et seq., demanding its removal. Pet.
App. 6a. Facebook responded by removing the page’s
“cover photo, but refused to delete the [Facebook] page
or otherwise prevent it from disseminating its harmful
and false message.” Id.
2.
This action followed. K.G.S. filed her
complaint in Jefferson County Circuit Court,
Birmingham, Alabama, in July 2017, naming
Facebook and various individual defendants involved
in the creation, updating, and promotion of the
Facebook page as defendants. Pet. App. 6a–8a. She
alleged that “persistent[] updat[ing]” of the Facebook
page “with various posts, news articles, and YouTube
videos at K.G.S.’s expense,” had made her “the posterchild for ‘predatory’ adoptions.” Id.
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Claims against Facebook and the other
defendants included negligence per se for violation of
various confidentiality provisions of the Alabama
Adoption Code and the Alabama common law torts of
outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress,
conspiracy, negligence, and wantonness. Id. The harm
alleged included reputational harm because K.G.S.’s
business associates, friends and family members
“view[ed] [her] in a different light,” as a result of
viewing the Facebook page. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32).
In addition, K.G.S. alleged she suffered emotional
distress from the disclosure of private information and
the hateful messages received from within (and
without) Alabama. Pet. App. 73a–74a (FAC ¶¶ 31–33).
In a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking
immediate deactivation of the Facebook page, K.G.S.
described threats made against her, including one that
she be “drug through the streets of Birmingham.”
Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, p. 309.
Facebook moved to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of
personal jurisdiction. An affidavit from a Facebook
employee confirmed Facebook’s incorporation in
Delaware and principal place of business in California,
and stated that the Facebook web site and mobile
application were “available for users to access
anywhere in the country (or in the world)” where there
is Internet access; “that individuals in all 50 states”
have Facebook accounts; that Facebook “is qualified to
do business” in all 50 states; and that Facebook “has
no offices, property, or employees located in Alabama.”
Pet. App. 8a–9a.
Following a hearing, on December 18, 2017, the
trial court denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss, Pet.
App. 12a, and entered a preliminary injunction
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against Facebook ordering deactivation of the page
given Facebook’s role as the principal disseminator of
confidential information and the irreparable injury to
K.G.S. from the disclosure. Id.; see also Pet. App. 55a–
57a.
3. Facebook appealed the grant of the
preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court of
Alabama arguing, as relevant here, that the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction and therefore had no
authority to order deactivation of the page. Pet. App.
13a. The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that
the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction did not comport
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, voided the preliminary injunction, and
instructed the trial court to dismiss all claims against
Facebook. Pet. App. 16a–36a, 51a. 3
a. With respect to general jurisdiction—a
holding that Petitioner does not request this Court to
review—the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that
Facebook was not “at home” in Alabama, because it
was not incorporated there, did not maintain its
principal place of business there, and K.G.S. presented
3 The reviewing court recognized as “well settled” that
Alabama’s long-arm rule, Rule 4.2 of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure (reproduced in full at Pet. App. 62a–65a) “extends the
personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit[s] of due
process under the United States and Alabama Constitutions.”
Pet. App. 15a (quoting Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech Grp., Inc.,
957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006)). Moreover, the “due process
guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution is coextensive with
the due process guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”
Id. (citing Ex parte Int’l Creative Mgmt. Partners, LLC, 258 So.
3d 1111, 1114–15 (Ala. 2018)).
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no evidence to prove otherwise. Pet. App. 17a–21a; see
also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19
(2014).
b. Turning next to specific jurisdiction, the
reviewing court relied on and quoted at length from
this Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277
(2014), as guiding precedent. Pet. App. 22a–25a. The
court observed that for specific jurisdiction, “the
defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a
substantial connection with the forum State.” Pet.
App. 22a (quoting Walden, 571 U.S at 284). It focused
especially on Walden’s teaching that the “plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum,” but “[r]ather, it is the defendant’s conduct that
must form the necessary connection with the forum
State” for the assertion of specific jurisdiction. Pet.
App. 24a (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 277, 285).
K.G.S. argued that Facebook intentionally aimed
its conduct toward Alabama, causing harm to an
Alabama citizen, and that its actions—including
refusal to delete the page that “wholly pertained to an
Alabama adoption,” after learning of the harm it
caused K.G.S. within Alabama—satisfied the effectsbased test for specific jurisdiction that this Court set
forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Pet. App.
26a.
The elements necessary for specific jurisdiction
were satisfied, K.G.S. argued because, as alleged in
the operative complaint, (1) Facebook committed an
intentional tort (IIED or outrage); (2) Facebook’s
intentional conduct was expressly aimed at Alabama,
as the Facebook page was filled with Alabama content
centered around Alabama residents, Alabama’s laws,
and an Alabama adoption; (3) the brunt of the harm
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caused by Facebook’s intentional conduct was suffered
in Alabama, by an Alabama resident, including in her
relationships with other Alabama residents who read
and commented on the page; and (4) Facebook knew
the harm from its intentional conduct was likely to be
suffered in Alabama. Pet. App. 26a–27a; id. at 73a
(FAC ¶ 32); Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, 322.
Even though the general availability of the
Facebook page—including its undisputed accessibility
to users in Alabama—was a critical fact that precluded
the exercise of general jurisdiction (because Facebook
could not possibly be “at home” everywhere it was
available, Pet. App. 20a n.9), the Alabama Supreme
Court declined to consider “the general fact that the
Facebook Web site and mobile application are
available for users in Alabama to access,” for purposes
of specific jurisdiction. Pet. App. 27a n.11. The court
reasoned that the Alabama-focused page’s availability
in Alabama was not pertinent to the specific
jurisdiction analysis because it was not “suit-related
conduct that was ‘purposefully directed’ to the forum.”
Id.
The reviewing court recited the facts in Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, at length and Walden’s discussion
of that case, 571 U.S. at 286–90. Pet. App. 27a–33a. It
then determined that this case was closer to Walden
than to Calder. Pet. App. 30a, 33a–35a. But in so
doing, Alabama’s highest court failed to consider
Facebook’s virtual contacts with the forum state
through the page itself, a question expressly left open
in Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 n.9.
The Alabama court thus concluded that
Facebook’s “suit-related conduct” was limited to the
interchanges with K.G.S. and her attorney and was
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precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” insufficient to
satisfy minimum contacts under Walden. Pet. App.
35a. Without elaboration, the court stated that “to the
extent that Facebook’s failure to act to remove the
Facebook page can be analyzed separately from the
responses it sent to K.G.S. and her attorney, we can
only conclude that this intentional conduct was
expressly aimed at K.G.S. herself, and not at Alabama
as a forum.” Pet. App. 35a.
Disregarding the jurisdictional elephant in the
room—Facebook’s virtual contacts with Alabama
residents by allowing the Alabama-focused page to
continue to be accessed in Alabama (and the resulting
reputational harm caused to K.G.S.)—the court
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
allow for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over
Facebook, Pet. App. 36a, voided the preliminary
injunction against Facebook, Pet. App. 36a; 51a, and
ordered the trial court to dismiss all claims against
Facebook with prejudice, Pet. App. 36a; 51a.
The Supreme Court of Alabama then denied
rehearing, Pet. App. 60a–61a and upon remand, the
Circuit Court of Jefferson County dismissed with
prejudice all the claims against Facebook, Pet. App.
53a–54a. This petition followed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case presents a recurring question of
nationwide importance on an issue expressly left open
by this Court in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
There, this Court—in response to arguments about
unfairness that might arise from declining to find
minimum contacts in the context of intentional torts
“committed via the Internet or other electronic
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means,” noted that Walden did “not present the very
different questions whether and how a defendant’s
virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’
with a particular State.” Id. at 290 n.9. Walden thus
expressly left questions about virtual contacts “for
another day.” Id. That day has arrived.
Since International Shoe, this Court’s teachings
have recognized that the types of contacts that satisfy
due process must evolve and adapt as technology
advances. And as virtual contacts have expanded, so
too have the opportunities for a defendant to reach into
a state and cause harm without any physical presence.
While the Information Age has transformed the ways
that Americans do business and communicate with
one another, this Court has yet to address the
jurisdictional ramifications of that transformation.
In particular, in the absence of clear guidance
from this Court, courts have struggled with what it
means to “target[] the forum” in a world where conduct
happens everywhere at once, but nowhere in
particular. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564
U.S. 873, 890 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by
Alito, J.).
Before Walden was decided, a fragile consensus
had developed in the lower courts that intentionally
tortious or infringing online content about a forum
state and causing known harm within that state
conferred jurisdiction, even if the publication was
universally available online and not—other than its
content—targeted at the forum state in any particular
sense. That consensus reflected a straightforward
application of this Court’s print-media decision in
Calder to electronic-media defamation and similar
torts.
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But after Walden, this consensus is eroding. In
cases involving intentional misconduct carried out
online, courts face a host of challenges in
disentangling a defendant’s contacts with a plaintiff
alone (which are not sufficient) from a defendant’s
contact with the forum state (which are).
The wrong turns made by the Alabama Supreme
Court here exemplify the disarray in the lower courts.
Here, while acknowledging Facebook’s broad virtual
reach, Alabama’s highest court gave that online
accessibility zero weight in its specific jurisdiction
analysis. Other courts, in contrast, have recognized
that broad accessibility can actually support, not
negate, a finding that a defendant purposefully
targeted its (virtual) conduct toward a particular
forum state. Those courts recognize that when a
publication is globally accessible, its content alone can
supply the necessary purposeful contacts with the
forum state.
The Alabama Supreme Court, on the other hand,
flatly rejected the proposition that targeted content on
a globally-available website can be enough. That was
wrong: Facebook’s refusal to remove a page that was
expressly aimed at Alabama—through its focus on an
Alabama adoption, critique of Alabama law,
showcasing of Alabama residents, and reputational
harm in Alabama from Alabama Facebook users who
read and commented on the page—was a
jurisdictionally significant contact with the forum,
even though the page was also viewable everywhere in
the world.
This case also illustrates the need for clear rules.
However this Court resolves the question, everyone
involved—courts across the country, individuals
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harmed by tortious or infringing online content, and
the millions of individuals and businesses who engage
in activity online every day and might find themselves
subject to suit—need to understand where the
boundaries of state authority lie. Does the expansive
reach of virtual conduct provide a get-out-ofjurisdiction-free
card
because
conduct
that
simultaneously occurs everywhere by definition is not
targeted anywhere? Or should a defendant be subject
to jurisdiction where it knowingly focuses the content
of a tortious online publication on a particular state,
even though the publication is simultaneously
available everywhere and it makes no other particular
effort to garner greater readership in that state than
any other?
As Facebook’s Chairman and CEO recognized
before the Senate in recent testimony, the internet can
be used to “give people a voice” but also to “hurt people
or spread misinformation.” 4 Where it is alleged that
Facebook knowingly allowed its platform to spread a
harmful and unlawful page—with knowledge that the
page focused on a particular state, criticized and
violated that state’s laws, and caused harm in that
state—it is critical that plaintiffs, states, and
defendants alike know with certainty whether a court
in that state can, consistent with due process,
adjudicate that claim. This Court’s intervention is
4

Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse
of Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 115th Cong. 1
(2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO,
Facebook), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/0410-18%20Zuckerberg%20Testimony.pdf.
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needed to answer Walden’s open question and provide
that clarity.
I.

The Decision Below Presents An Important
And Far-Reaching Question Of Federal Law
Left Open By This Court.

This Court has long recognized that the
jurisdictional inquiry is neither “mechanical [n]or
quantitative.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945). “Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure.” Id. This qualitative
assessment of whether due process permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction focuses upon “the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977); see also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495
U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality opinion) (International
Shoe “cast ... aside” fictions of “consent” and
“presence”).
Changes in technology have long been part and
parcel of this evolution towards relinquishing
formalistic rules in favor of a more qualitative inquiry.
More than half a century ago, this Court recognized
that gains in “technological progress” can lead to a
“similar increase” in the “need for jurisdiction over
nonresidents”; that “progress in communication and
transportation” has reduced the burden of defending a
suit in a foreign tribunal; and that these trends
explained the jettisoning of the rigid requirements of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in favor of
International Shoe’s more flexible approach. Hansen v.
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Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958). Technological
advances have thus, for decades, altered the stakes for
personal jurisdiction by enhancing state interests in
reaching the conduct of nonresident defendants and
minimizing burdens for those haled into court outside
of their “home” state. See Julie Cromer Young, The
Online-Contacts Gamble After Walden v. Fiore, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753, 754 (2015) (hereinafter
Young, Online-Contacts Gamble).
But
this
Court’s
personal
jurisdiction
jurisprudence has yet to join the Internet age, even as
Justices have questioned how standards like
“targeting the forum” can be applied given today’s
interconnected economy. See Nicastro, 564 U.S at 890
(Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.); see also id.
(“But what do those standards mean when a company
targets the world by selling products from its Web
site?”).
In the absence of clear guidance from this Court,
lower courts have plunged ahead, with some
recognizing the modern reality that targeting a
nationwide market can, at least in some
circumstances, constitute targeting any particular
state within that market and others, like the Alabama
Supreme Court here, hewing to a more hidebound
mode of analysis. See infra pp. 26–29. Lower courts
have noted the Court’s failure to “reconceive[] and
rearticulate[]” “the due process concepts of personal
jurisdiction … in light of advances in technology.” ALS
Scan, Inc. v. Dig. Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707,
713 (4th Cir. 2002). Laments are frequent “that this is
an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet had
the occasion to give clear guidance[.]” Plixer Int’l, Inc.
v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2018).
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The time for that guidance has arrived. There can
be no doubt that “[u]se of the internet for commercial
ventures has steadily and exponentially grown since
1995, when the internet was untethered from a single
National Science Foundation backbone.” Young,
Online-Contacts Gamble, at 754 & n.4. And,
increasingly, virtual contacts are what connect us, as
any observer of teenagers well knows. In the U.S.,
“adults spend more than 6 hours per day on digital
media.” Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social
Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/s3urrcn. Today, roughly seven in
ten adults in the United States use Facebook. See John
Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook,
RESEARCH
CENTER
(May
16,
2019),
PEW
https://tinyurl.com/y4apu58j.
Virtual exchanges provide an ever-moreattractive option for personal and business
interactions in the United States. And just as
constitutional limits to the reach of other state powers
reflect technological advances, so too should due
process constraints on the exercises of a state’s
adjudicatory authority. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097
(“[I]t [is] manifest that the physical presence rule as
defined by Quill must give way to the ‘far-reaching
systemic and structural changes in the economy’ and
‘many other societal dimensions’ caused by the Cyber
Age.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Allen
Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local
Effects of Intentional Misconduct, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 385, 424–26 (2015) (hereinafter Erbsen, Local
Effects) (discussing similarities in evolution of due
process limits on personal jurisdiction and state taxing
power).
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Despite the ever-growing swath of interactions
taking place online rather than in person—and the
inevitable ever-growing stream of controversies
generated by the virtual contacts that now permeate
our lives—this Court has yet to resolve how to assess
virtual conduct or presence for purposes of personal
jurisdiction analysis—i.e., when and how virtual
presence can be considered an “activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
On the contrary, in Walden, the Court left for
“another day” the “questions whether and how a
defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate
into ‘contacts’ with a particular State,” because there
was “no question where the conduct ... took place,” in
that case. 571 U.S. at 290 n.9. And in Nicastro, 564
U.S. at 887, Justice Breyer (writing for himself and
Justice Alito) cautioned against “announce[ment of] a
rule of broad applicability without full consideration of
the modern-day consequences” because that case did
not present any of those issues. Id.
The five years since Walden have not improved
the situation. As scholars have observed, and a
panoply of cases demonstrate, “American courts are
still virtually without guidance, left to determine for
themselves the extent of Walden’s application to
contacts that remain primarily online.” Young, Online-
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Contacts Gamble at 755; see also Erbsen, Local Effects
at 415–16. 5
In particular, the lack of guidance regarding the
relevance of the effects of an intentional tortfeasor’s
conduct in the virtual realm has presented recurring
problems. We call it the Information Age for a reason.
And it is the information-based torts (copyright
infringement, trademark infringement, defamation,
invasion of privacy, unlawful disclosure, and so on)
that have increasingly moved entirely online. The
connections between the defendant’s conduct, a
defamatory article’s content, the harmful effects on
the plaintiff, and the forum state are relatively easy to
articulate when a publisher physically circulates
copies of a defamatory article within a state. See
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In those
circumstances, courts can comfortably say that “the
‘effects’ caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of
the California public—connected the defendants’
conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived
there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 288.
But what happens when a defendant can achieve
precisely the same effects—harm to reputation in the
5

A search for post-Walden cases addressing specific
jurisdiction in the context of virtual contacts yielded, by
conservative estimate, scores of decisions from the federal courts
of appeals, state courts of last resort, and federal district courts.
That so many cases have been generated since Walden was
decided in 2014, but with no guidance from the Court for how to
handle precisely the question that Walden left open, is strong
reason to grant this petition. All the more so because Walden
introduced more division into the lower courts regarding how to
handle the issue, as detailed in Part II.
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forum state—at the click of a button, merely by posting
something simultaneously to the entire world? Then,
can a court find that the harmful effects are the result
of the defendant’s conduct toward (or “in”) the forum
state? Or is the reputational injury merely connected
to a plaintiff who lives there? The formal distinction
between a defendant’s contacts “with the forum State
itself” and its contacts “with persons who reside
there,” Id. at 285—a distinction that drove Walden’s
jurisdictional analysis—blurs when all the contacts
are electronic.
Walden expressly refused to address these issues
because that case did not involve virtual conduct or
presence. This Court’s guidance is needed to answer
the important question flagged in Nicastro and
expressly left open in Walden, and to clarify that a
defendant’s virtual presence and conduct can sustain
a state’s authority to assert specific jurisdiction where,
as here, the brunt of the injury is felt in the forum
state and the substance of the alleged misconduct, as
here, is centered around that forum.
II.

This Case Presents A Recurring Question
Which Has Confused And Divided The
Lower Courts.

Jurisdiction is fairly clear in cases involving old
media—the physical circulation of newspapers and
magazines. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 773–74 (1984) (finding a publisher’s “regular
circulation of magazines in the forum State is
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a
libel action based on the contents of the magazine”).
When a complaint involves the publication or
dissemination of allegedly tortious or infringing
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material on a website, however—even, or especially,
one with millions of subscribers and a vast user base
in every state—courts of appeals and state courts of
last resort have struggled in the absence of clear
guidance from this Court.
Courts are virtually unanimous that the mere
accessibility in a state of a passive website that
displays information not targeted to a particular state
is not alone enough for specific jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Plixer Int’l, 905 F.3d at 8 (collecting cases); ALS Scan,
293 F.3d at 714 (“[A] person who simply places
information on the Internet does not subject himself to
jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic
signal is transmitted and received.”). Beyond that
guidepost, however, a significant divide has emerged
in the years following Walden.
A. Pre-Walden, a Fragile Consensus Held
that Virtual Contacts Could Establish
Specific Jurisdiction for Intentional
Torts
Involving
Globally-Accessible,
Forum-Focused Online Content.
Before Walden, the courts of appeals and state
courts of last resort that considered the question
appeared to accept that where an intentional tort was
committed by means of a universally-accessible
website, the online activity constituted minimum
contacts with the forum state if the tortious or
infringing page focused on the state or the plaintiff’s
in-state activities, or the defendant knew that the
brunt of the harm would be suffered in the forum state,
or some combination of these factors.
In the most jurisdiction-friendly camp, the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits rested jurisdiction solely on the
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tortfeasor’s intentional targeting of a particular
plaintiff through a website accessible in the forum
state, with knowledge that the plaintiff would suffer
harm within that state. See, e.g., Mavrix Photo, Inc. v.
Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011)
(describing circuit law that “operating even a passive
website in conjunction with ‘something more’” can
confer jurisdiction, and “something more” can turn on
“whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a
plaintiff known to be a forum resident”) (internal
citations omitted); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d
1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding jurisdiction based
on website’s infringement of copyrighted photo of
Florida musician because the infringement was “an
intentional tort, expressly aimed at a specific
individual in the forum whose effects were suffered in
the forum”).
Other courts required some additional contact
beyond knowledge (and intent) that harm would be
suffered in the forum state. For example, the Tenth
Circuit held in Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235,
1244 (10th Cir. 2011), that “defamatory postings may
give rise to personal jurisdiction if they … make the
forum state the focal point of the message.” Id. at
1244–45 (finding no jurisdiction where the forum state
“was not the focal point of the email … either in terms
of its audience or its content”); accord Silver v. Brown,
382 F. App’x 723, 729–30 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
jurisdiction could be exercised in New Mexico where a
blog “was about a New Mexico resident and a New
Mexico company,” complained about “actions [that]
occurred mainly in New Mexico,” “the blog was widely
available in New Mexico over the internet,” and the
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defendant “had knowledge that the brunt of the injury
to [the plaintiff] would be felt in New Mexico”).
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit held that
jurisdiction was proper in Illinois where defendants
used websites to defame an Illinois business, knowing
that the plaintiff operated the business in Illinois and
would be harmed there, listed his Illinois address, and
urged readers to contact him there to complain.
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 697–98 (7th Cir.
2010). But for a defendant that did nothing other than
repost some defamatory messages, without either
mentioning Illinois or knowing that the plaintiff’s
business operated there, jurisdiction did not lie. Id. at
698–99. Some state courts of last resort followed the
same rule. See, e.g., Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v.
Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 795–96 (Ohio 2010) (holding
minimum contacts satisfied where the defendant
made defamatory statements online about the
plaintiff’s Ohio activities, harming plaintiff’s
reputation centered in Ohio, and there was evidence
that at least five Ohioans read the postings).
Courts that rejected personal jurisdiction over
virtual, intentional torts pre-Walden did not generally
reject the content-plus-brunt-of-harm framework.
Instead, they found jurisdiction impermissible where
the allegedly tortious online content did not focus on
the forum state, and therefore the only connection
between the forum state and the tort was the
happenstance of the plaintiff’s residence, sometimes
unknown to the alleged tortfeasor.
For example, in Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th
Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit rejected Texas jurisdiction
over a suit against the Massachusetts author of an
allegedly defamatory article and the New York
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provider of the online forum where the article was
posted. Id. at 473. The court held that there was no
specific jurisdiction in Texas because the article
“contains no reference to Texas, nor does it refer to the
Texas activities of” the plaintiff. Id. It did not draw on
Texas sources and there was no indication that the
article found a particular audience in Texas. Id.
Indeed, the “[author] was apparently unaware that
[the plaintiff] then resided in Texas.” Id. at 469; accord
Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 679 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding no jurisdiction in Ohio where
defendant’s website “specifically refers to [the
plaintiff’s] activities in Massachusetts” and “[n]either
the site, nor any of its listed articles directly discuss
[the plaintiff’s] activities in Ohio”); Griffis v. Luban,
646 N.W.2d 527, 535–36 (Minn. 2002) (holding
Alabama court lacked jurisdiction over a defamation
claim where the online forum was “organized around
the subjects of archeology and Egyptology, not
Alabama or the University of Alabama academic
community” and there was no evidence that anyone
other than the plaintiff read the postings in Alabama).
There is some variation in results based on
courts’ differing assessments of whether location was
central or incidental to the content of the tortfeasor’s
postings. Compare Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 697 (finding
jurisdiction where defamatory web posting listed
plaintiff’s Illinois address), with Johnson v. Arden, 614
F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that even
though an allegedly defamatory posting twice
referenced the location of a business, and the plaintiffs
suffered reputation harm there, “the inclusion of
‘Missouri’ in the posting was incidental and not
‘performed for the very purpose of having …
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consequences’ felt in Missouri” and therefore
jurisdiction was not consistent with due process); see
also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding Virginia lacked jurisdiction
over defamation claim for articles published by
Connecticut newspapers online that mentioned a
Virginia warden’s treatment of Connecticut prisoners
where the “focus of the articles … was the Connecticut
prisoner transfer policy and its impact … in
Connecticut”). But the fragile consensus pre-Walden
was that an intentionally tortious or infringing online
publication focused on activities within a forum state
and causing known harm within that state conferred
jurisdiction, even if the publication was universally
available online.
B. Walden Introduced Confusion
Eroded the Emerging Consensus.

and

Properly understood—especially given its
express reservation of the “virtual contacts” question,
571 U.S. at 290 n.9—this Court’s decision in Walden
should not have disturbed this emerging consensus.
Unfortunately, however, some courts have taken an
expansive view of Walden’s scope, creating a new
divide in authority and effectively rendering Calder
inapplicable in the modern era. So even though
Walden disclaimed any intent to address virtual
contacts, its requirement that the defendant’s ties be
with the forum—not only the plaintiff—created
division and confusion in the lower courts for virtual
misconduct cases.
Those courts of appeals that had adopted a
general rule permitting targeted harm to a known
forum resident alone to satisfy due process for any
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intentional tort—physical or virtual—properly
recognized that Walden foreclosed such a blanket rule.
See, e.g., Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874
F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Following Walden,
we now hold that while a theory of individualized
targeting may remain relevant to the minimum
contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction.”); Advanced Tactical
Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751
F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Any decision that
implies” a plaintiff can “be the only link between the
defendant and the forum” “can no longer be considered
authoritative” after Walden).
That is where the consensus ends. Some courts,
such as the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, have
recognized that in a virtual contacts case, the website
accessible in the forum state is itself a relevant
contact—even if the site is available nationwide, and
especially if it has an acknowledged user base in the
state. Those circuits hold that the website, combined
with known and foreseeable harm within the forum, is
enough without some greater evidence of forum-state
targeting. See, e.g., Plixer Int’l, 905 F.3d at 8–9
(holding that serving U.S. market through an
interactive website that accepted U.S. users and did
not block web traffic from the U.S. was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction over a trademark infringement suit
against a German defendant even though the company
targeted a global market without specific targeting of
the U.S. market); EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 98 (2d Cir. 2016)
(approving specific jurisdiction in New York over
largely free online music storage service because the
executive was aware that the site had 400 users in
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New York even though the website “served a national
market, as opposed to a New York-specific market”);
Alpha Phoenix Indus., LLC v. SCI Int’l, Inc., 666 F.
App’x 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding defendants
purposefully reached “into Arizona by posting
allegedly defamatory statements about” an Arizona
business with “intent to affect Plaintiff's business,
which is based and operates in Arizona”) (citing
Walden, 571 U.S. at 285).
Consistent with this view, many state courts of
last resort have continued to espouse the rule that
online publication of content about the forum state or
the plaintiff’s forum-state activities satisfies minimum
contacts for due process, even if the website is widely
available. See, e.g., Harper v. BioLife Energy Sys., Inc.,
426 P.3d 1067, 1075 (Alaska 2018) (holding online
brochure did not create minimum contacts with
Alaska because no “Alaska resident ever actually
viewed the brochure online,” it did not draw “on
Alaska sources,” and the author did not know “of any
connection its brochure would have to Alaska”); TV
Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 47 (Tex. 2016)
(affirming “subject-and-sources test” but finding
jurisdiction on other grounds).
Other courts, including the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits, have issued decisions that effectively
disregard any web activity that is nationwide in scope
unless there is some evidence of targeted advertising
of the website, or similar activity, in the forum state.
In Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d
895 (10th Cir. 2017), for example, the Tenth Circuit
rejected Colorado jurisdiction over a claim arising out
of a subscriber’s use in Colorado of allegedly defective
maintenance manuals received through an online
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subscription. Id. at 900–01. Among other reasons, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had not proved
the defendant advertised its manual-subscription
program to Colorado, specifically (as opposed to
nationally) and the manual subscriptions were equally
available nationwide. Id. at 916–17. Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit held that an interactive website
available in Indiana that posted allegedly trademarkinfringing material, coupled with infringing emails to
lists that included Indiana customers and knowledge
of the harm the infringement would cause in Indiana
was not enough, without more, to satisfy due process.
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at
801. Because the defendant’s interactive website was
available nationwide, the Court concluded it evidenced
no intent to target the Indiana market, but noted that
“geographically-restricted online ads” might suffice to
show targeting. Id. at 803.
The Alabama Supreme Court followed the latter
model here, relying in part on the Seventh Circuit’s
decision, Pet. App. 27a n.11, and rejecting the
decisions of other courts of appeals as swept away by
Walden, Pet. App. 33a & n.12. Disregarding
Facebook’s Alabama user base, Pet. App. 27a n.11, and
failing to recognize that the content of a page that
“wholly pertained to an Alabama adoption,” Pet. App.
26a, is itself a relevant contact, the Alabama Supreme
Court reached a result that cannot be reconciled with
the decisions described above that, even after Walden,
continue to recognize that forum-state subject and
sources are a relevant (and sufficient) contact
satisfying due process.
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III. The Alabama Supreme Court Erred By Its
Overly Expansive Application Of Walden To
Virtual Contacts, A Question That Walden
Expressly Left Open.
Under a straightforward application of Calder,
this case should have come out differently. The page
that Facebook refused to take down, and continued to
disseminate, was entirely about an Alabama adoption.
Every key element described on the page was
connected to Alabama: the birth mother, the adoptive
mother, Baby Doe, the procedures followed and
decisions issued by Alabama courts, and a purportedly
unique (and much-criticized) aspect of Alabama law
permitting pre-birth consent to adoption (described by
the page as illegal in 48 states). Pet. App. 5a–6a; id. at
50a & n.18; id. at 71a (FAC ¶¶ 20–21); FAC, Exhibit
A, at 5, Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, at 336. The videos on
the page were taken in Alabama. Pet. App. 72a (FAC
¶ 25). Facebook disseminated the page widely in
Alabama: it has users there, Pet. App. 9a; K.G.S.’s
friends, family, and business associates saw the page,
Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32); and K.G.S. received “hateful
messages” in response to the page from numerous
Alabama residents and organizations, Pet. App. 73a
(FAC ¶ 30), including one that she should be “drug
through the streets of Birmingham,” Record on
Appeal, Vol. 2, at 309. Facebook was given notice,
moreover, that the information on the page was
confidential under Alabama law and that its
dissemination of the page was causing harm to K.G.S.
in Alabama. Pet. App. 11a.
Put another way, the “story concerned the
[Alabama] activities of a [Alabama] resident,” the
story centered on Alabama adoption laws and
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procedures, the page “was drawn from [Alabama]
sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of
[the plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to
her … reputation, was suffered in [Alabama]. In sum,
[Alabama] is the focal point both of the [page] and of
the harm suffered.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.
True, Facebook did not write the page. But it did
review the page for compliance with its Community
Standards, approved the page as compliant (reversing
an initial decision), declined to remove the page, and
continued to disseminate it using the Facebook
platform, Pet. App. 6a—even after being given notice
that the page did not comply with Alabama law and
was causing harm in Alabama. Cf. Calder, 465 U.S. at
786 (holding California had personal jurisdiction over
Florida editor who approved the subject of an article,
edited it, and declined to print a retraction).
In Walden, the Court stressed that “the ‘effects’
caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to
the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the
California public—connected the defendants’ conduct
to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there.”
571 U.S. at 288. So, too here. The injury and emotional
distress caused by disclosure of information kept
confidential under Alabama law depends upon its
disclosure to readers in Alabama, such as K.G.S.’s
friends, neighbors, and business associates who
viewed her in a different light after reading the page,
Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32), just as the defamation tort
in Calder depended upon reputational injury in
California from the article’s dissemination there,
Walden, 571 U.S. at 287–88. True, the magazine at
issue in Calder physically entered California and was
circulated in print to approximately 600,000
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Californians. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. And given the
nature of modern media, the page at issue here did not
physically travel anywhere. But it was circulated
virtually within Alabama, likely to a large number of
Facebook’s undisputed users within the state, Pet.
App. 9a, many of which sent “hateful messages” to
K.G.S. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶¶ 30–31).
The Alabama Supreme Court was thus wrong to
woodenly conclude that contacts between Petitioner’s
attorney and Facebook were the only suit-related
connection between Facebook and Alabama; and could
be disregarded because they were not initiated by
Facebook. Pet. App. 32a, 34a. Perhaps because Walden
failed to address virtual contacts, the Alabama
Supreme Court failed to consider the jurisdictional
import of the page itself—which Facebook reviewed
and made the decision to continue to disseminate.
Petitioner is not arguing that jurisdiction lies in
Alabama solely because of the happenstance of
Petitioner’s residence there—an avenue that Walden
concededly forecloses. Petitioner is arguing that
continued dissemination of a page all about
Alabama—fed by Alabama sources and read and
commented on by Alabama residents—with
knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be
suffered in Alabama, creates sufficient contacts to
satisfy due process.
It is not as if the page addressed Petitioner’s
activities in another state—or even activities that
occurred in Alabama but for which the Alabama
location was irrelevant. See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796
(finding insufficient contacts with Missouri where any
mentions of the state were “incidental” to allegedly
defamatory web posts). Rather, the page attacked
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Petitioner’s adoption of Baby Doe precisely because it
occurred in Alabama, purportedly one of only two
states to permit pre-birth consent to adoption.
Moreover, one of the harms alleged was uniquely
Alabamian, resulting from disclosure of information
that Alabama protects as confidential. The location in
Alabama is as central (if not more so) to the page that
Facebook reviewed, refused to take down, and
wrongfully continued to disseminate as the
entertainment industry’s California locus was to the
tort at issue in Calder. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.
When the page’s subject matter is properly
considered, it becomes difficult to understand the
Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that Facebook’s
failure to remove the page was “intentional conduct …
expressly aimed at K.G.S. herself and not at Alabama
as a forum.” Pet. App. 35a. Although the harm was
suffered by K.G.S., the conduct of continuing to
disseminate the page, given its subject matter, was at
the very least aimed at Alabama readers as well as
K.G.S. herself.
The Court’s reasoning falls even wider of the
mark in its refusal to consider Facebook’s availability
in Alabama. Pet. App. 27a n.11. First, Facebook is not
merely “accessible” in Alabama; it has a base of users
there who sign up for its service and are accepted (or
not) by Facebook. Pet. App. 9a. Second, even if mere
accessibility is not alone enough to satisfy minimum
contacts—a point no one disputes—that does not make
the availability of Facebook to Alabama readers
wholly irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry, any
more than “mere” availability on newsstands
nationwide would make the circulation of an Alabamafocused article within Alabama irrelevant if this case
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involved paper-based media. And, in any event, the
complaint did not allege that the page was merely
available to Alabama residents; it alleged that many
of them read it and sent K.G.S. hateful messages in
response. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 30).
Ultimately, and “[i]n contrast to general, allpurpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.’” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564
U.S. at 919 (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald
T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)). Here,
the Alabama-focused page lies at the very core of the
controversy, and this Court should clarify that under
such circumstances, jurisdiction is proper, even when
the page was also available everywhere in the world.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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